Bayesian Networks (BNs) are widely used for knowledge representation and probabilistic inference in stochastic domains. An attempt is made in the risk modeling context to develop a general Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) [16] . Following this initial ASRM, an operational/maintenance ASRM prototype is developed that is based on real case studies [17] . Past and current research efforts focus on multiple case designs in the context of an aviation accident category. Hierarchical Bayesian Networks (HBNs) are an extension to the conventional BN methodology, which provide an expressive power by allowing a node in the network to represent an individual BN. HBNs express the knowledge in a structured way, leading to more realistic probabilistic models. HBNs, like classical BNs, represent a stochastic modeling language, where the random variables symbolize the domain attributes. The probabilistic dependencies among the variables are modeled using directed acyclic graphs. A new case that combines different cases to obtain a single safety enhancement value can be designed using HBNs. The use of HBNs presents a novel application in the aviation safety domain and offers significant promise for risk assessments of an aviation safety product portfolio.
Introduction
Risk management is a process that comprises certain steps to assist individuals in making optimal decisions within the context of a problem. These steps are the identification, quantification and measurement, as well as the acceptance, avoidance and mitigation of risk [6] . A substantial research area in the risk management process is risk modeling of low probability/high consequence (lp/hc) events, such as transportation accidents, nuclear power plant accidents, and chemical plant explosions [23] . The focus of this paper is on aircraft accidents that may be classified as lp/hc transportation accidents. The need to prevent such events or to reduce their risk has grown substantially in the past decades.
A general Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) is developed [16] that provides accident investigators and safety analysts with the insight of tracing accidents to multiple causes in a probabilistic manner by using Bayesian Networks (BNs). Despite its comprehensive character, quantification of this large BN model was too difficult to achieve [3] . Hence, an operational/maintenance ASRM prototype is developed [17] that is based on actual case studies. The aim in this further effort is to reduce the ambiguity for end-users through integrating the overarching framework of the Reason model [20] with the BN methodology, and to obtain a more meaningful representation based on real aircraft accident case studies. Reason contends that there are interactions among individual factors and latent factors in an accident. This model is composed of three layers of factors: organizational factors, task and environmental factors and individual factors. Fig. 1 depicts possible failures in each layer and the pathway leading to an accident. ************************ Insert Fig. 1 . here ************************ A BN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where nodes represent domain attributes and the edges stand for the probabilistic dependencies among the attributes. Each node in the network is a random variable and has a set of possible states [8] . A crucial aspect of BNs is that they allow probabilistic reasoning given information about states of its nodes. Hence, by integrating the Reason model and the BNs, the operational/maintenance ASRM facilitates performing scenario analyses based on actual case studies.
This paper provides an extension to the ASRM models developed earlier in two ways. First, it focuses on the evaluation of the impact of advanced aviation safety products on the probability of a maintenancerelated aircraft accident occurring in the National Airspace System (NAS). Second, it adopts a holistic approach by combining multiple case studies in the context of the aircraft maintenance accident category.
To this end, an extension to the classical BNs, Hierarchical Bayesian Networks (HBNs) are used. The HBN risk model developed in this paper uses a normative expert system, the Hugin Expert [1] . It focuses on the probability component or likelihood of maintenance-related accidents. The severity component is assumed to be constant. The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 introduces Bayesian Networks. Section 3 introduces HBNs using three illustrative examples. These examples illustrate the use of HBNs in order to capture the time-dependency in a problem with repetitive structures [5] . Furthermore, the use of decision variables in HBNs is explained. Section 4 is devoted to a novel application in the aviation system safety context. An HBN model that captures the hierarchy in the aviation system safety problem is explained. In Section 5, we present results obtained by using decision variables in the HBN. Finally, future research directions conclude the paper.
Bayesian Networks
Definition 1 (Bayesian Network). A Bayesian Network (BN) over a set of random variables (nodes) consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and an associated numerical component in the form of conditional and prior probability distributions. A DAG is considered acyclic if there is no directed path X 1 , X 2, …, X n such that X 1 = X n . Every directed edge from X i to X j in the graph indicates a probabilistic dependence between the variables X i and X j . The node X i is called a parent of X j and X j is referred to as a child of X i. The set of all parents of a node X i is denoted by
A random variable in a BN represents a set of possible states, and is in exactly one of its states. A possible state of the problem domain is obtained after fixing the random variables to certain states [19] . Then, distinct combinations of the states of random variables can represent all possible states of the problem domain. ************************* Insert Fig. 2 . here ************************* Each variable X i has a conditional probability distribution
BNs specify a joint probability distribution over a set of random variables. Each possible state of the problem domain is assigned a real number in [0, 1] . Let S be a finite set of possible states of the problem domain. Formally, a probability distribution over S is a function such that [19] .
Let X be a random variable with the probability distribution vector , and X.
Assume that P{U}, the joint probability distribution of the collection of random variables, can be obtained easily. Then the probability of a random variable X, P{X}, is calculated by marginalization [21] over all s as follows:
The above equation is also expressed [4] as
Now, if we would like to enter information e represented by the finding e into U, we again can compute according to Bayes' formula [21] : 
This implies that if P {U} can be computed easily, then we can perform probabilistic inference based on the available information. Furthermore, if there are a total of n findings, any order of findings entered out of n! possible orderings yields the same joint distribution of P{U, e}. Although the calculation of ) | ( e X P } U is performed using vectors, is calculated through operations on joint probability tables for discrete random variables. However, even for small sets of variables, the joint probability table becomes intractably large. Hence, the process of inference in BNs is performed on another graphical structure that is obtained after a set of transformations of the original DAG of the network. The graphical structure obtained after a set of transformations is called a join or junction tree. Message passing algorithms are used on join trees for probabilistic inference [4, 15, 18] . The following examples illustrate the use of an HBN to deal with time-dependency issues in a problem. Section 4 presents another use of an HBN, which captures the hierarchy and the embedded structure in the aviation system safety problem domain. *************************** Insert Fig. 3 . here *************************** We notice from Fig. 3 that a fragment of the DAG is being repeated. We can construct the same BN in an object oriented manner by defining a class called Day that is composed of the variables M, P and A, and then creating objects of this class. However, since an object is encapsulated in a way that its certain nodes are invisible from outside the class, we encounter two types of interactions among objects and nodes [2] . A node of an object might have parents outside the object or a node outside an object might have a parent inside an object. The former interaction causes modeling problems since conditional and prior probability distributions specified in a class should not be changed in any instance of that class. However, this keeps one from assigning parents to a node inside an object, which in turn limits the modeling capabilities. Hence a new type of node, called the reference node, is added into an object [2] . A reference node is also called the "input node" of an object. It represents a pointer to a node in another scope. The node to which the input node references to is called the referenced node. In this framework, a link is established between an input node and its referenced node, which is therefore called the reference link. The states and the probability distribution of an input node are the same as its referenced node. Input nodes are accessible from outside an object, which provide the capability of establishing interactions among nodes belonging to different scopes. Use of input nodes and referenced nodes are illustrated subsequently.
Example 2 (The Player Example revisited).
Note that in Example 1, variables A, M and P are used for each day of the performance. Hence, the class Day can be modeled as follows: ******************************* Insert Fig. 4 . here ******************************* Now, let D be the class described in Fig ******************************* Insert Fig. 5 . here ******************************* Next, we create the objects belonging to D.
******************************* Insert Fig. 6 . here ******************************* As noted above, input nodes are references to a node in another scope. This implies that input nodes can at most have one parent. Input nodes might have no parents at certain parts of a model. For example, D 1 .M r has no parent node and therefore should possess a default prior probability distribution.
There is one more type of node that an object can contain besides the input and output nodes: internal nodes. Internal nodes are inaccessible from outside an object. Note that the internal nodes M and P are invisible from outside the objects illustrated in Fig. 6 .
Inference in HBNs
Probabilistic inference in HBNs can be performed in two ways. One way is to build the underlying flat BN corresponding to the HBN. Then, inference algorithms are implemented on this underlying flat network.
Another way is to build a Multiply Sectioned Bayesian Network (MSBN) [25] . Inference is then performed on this MSBN [13] . Hugin Expert follows the first approach and performs probabilistic inference on the corresponding flat network. A flat BN for a Hierarchical BN can be obtained by removing the reference links and merging the reference and referenced nodes that belong to the same level of hierarchy. This operation is performed successively for each level of hierarchy. Consequently, reference nodes not referencing another node will become regular nodes with their default prior probability distributions [2] .
Introducing Decision Variables
Decision variables can be incorporated into a Hierarchical BN. Using decision variables is similar to using chance variables. However, the notion of a decision variable is completely different from that of a chance node. The set of decision variables introduced to a BN should be linearly ordered, which captures the temporal aspect of the decisions being made one after the other [9] . Therefore, the same input-output scheme is also applicable to decision nodes. Using the input-output scheme and reference links described, we can linearly order the decision nodes by creating a path in the model containing all the decisions. This issue is addressed through the following extension of the Player Example.
Example 3 (The Player Example with decision variables). Suppose that the performance of the player in
Example 2 is also affected by how large the audience is. Hence, we have the flat network depicted in Fig. 7, where Au1, Au2, Au3 represent the chance nodes regarding how large the audience is.
******************************* Insert Fig. 7 . here ******************************* Now suppose that the number of people coming to the play in a certain day can be affected by the quantity of ads delivered during that day. Hence, the intervening action regarding the amount of ads can be represented as a decision variable. Then the flat model should be as shown in Fig. 8 . Note that the decision node Ad represents the quantity of ads delivered. The directed arcs between the decision nodes constitute the linear path containing all decision nodes. It is important to see that each decision node has one arc going into and coming out of it. The arc going into it is the one coming out of the previous decision node.
This implies that a decision node should be considered as both an input node and an output node. However, this is impossible in the framework described previously. Yet, a class can be created as shown in Fig. 9 , enabling us to overcome the difficulty encountered.
***************************** Insert Fig. 8 . here ***************************** Since the node "Ad" has a parent outside its scope, there should be a reference node to it. "Ad" also has a child outside its own scope. Hence, there should be an output node associated with it.
***************************** Insert Fig. 9 . here *****************************
Having the class represented, we can create the objects as illustrated in Fig. 10 . Note that only the interface nodes are visible to the outside of an object.
**************************** Insert Fig. 10 here **************************** It is crucial to note that, unlike chance nodes, decision nodes only have an impact in the direction of the directed edges. This can easily be seen by noting that any decision about the number of ads delivered during a day cannot affect the mood of the player on the previous day. Hence, while fixing a decision node to a certain state on a day alters the joint probability distributions P{Au, P, A} on that day and the coming days in future, it does not alter P{M, M r } on that day and on any previous days.
Applications in the Aviation Safety Domain
The discussions in the previous sections are applied to the aviation safety domain in this section. An HBN is used to capture the embedded structure in the problem domain and interactions of various entities.
Decision variables are used in the HBN model to project safety enhancements upon implementing advanced aviation safety products. The safety enhancement values obtained after probabilistic inference over the HBN are in the form of percentage decreases of the probabilities of certain nodes being in their "Occur" states. Section 4.1 provides a brief introduction to the aviation safety products used in the HBN model developed in this research.
Aviation Safety Products
The safety enhancement products being developed by the Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) established by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1997 are comprised of seven product suites [14] .
The main objective in developing these products is to reduce the fatal aviation accident rate. products focus on either eliminating or mitigating icing problems [14] .
Motivation to Use HBNs
The need to evaluate the projected safety enhancement impact of product suites on an aircraft accident category, such as maintenance-related (MAIN) accidents, requires further research. The Aviation System
Risk Models developed so far are based on multiple actual aircraft accident case studies. Each of the actual case studies provides a structure and a causal description from which a BN can be constructed to evaluate the impact of safety products in an accident that may follow a similar causal description captured by the case study. An accident category is represented by multiple representative actual case studies as shown in Fig. 11 . Hence, multiple safety enhancement values are associated with an accident type.
************************** Insert Fig. 11 here ************************** Most organizational and technology-based systems are hierarchical in nature and risk modeling of such complex systems requires addressing the hierarchical character embedded in the system [6] . The risk associated with each sub-system within the hierarchical structure contributes to the overall system risk. The hierarchical nature of the aviation system domain calls for a new case design, where multiple cases in one context are combined in order to obtain a generic case and consequently, a single safety enhancement value associated with an accident category. A new design can be as illustrated in Fig. 12 .
The research question in this paper concerns the projected impact of aviation safety products on the safety enhancements in maintenance accidents, which is represented in a hierarchical manner by combining different representative maintenance case studies.
*************************** Insert Fig. 12 . here ***************************
Hierarchical Bayesian Network Model
The current research performs analysis on four maintenance models using the Hugin Expert for ***************************** Insert Fig. 13 . here ***************************** A similar approach is followed for the Part 135 Structural Failure (Part 135) node. A crucial aspect of the model developed in this paper is the quantification of CPTs used in the hierarchical model shown in Fig.   13 . Any chance variable with one or more parents in the model has a CPT associated with it. Probability elicitation and, extraction and quantification of expert judgment about uncertain quantities is a very important part of modeling with BNs. Representativeness is a mode of expert judgment and means that the probability of an event is evaluated according to the degree to which it is considered representative of some specific major characteristics of the process from which it originated [22] . The CPTs associated with Part 121 and Part 135 Structural Failure nodes are obtained using representative indices for each case that comprises the Part 121 and Part135 Structural Failure nodes. A representative index of a case study is a measure of how typical a case is for a given accident category. These indices are determined by expert judgment elicitation based on the insights provided in [11, 12] . The details of using representative indices are explained in [10] .
The causal description of the four case studies and safety products inserted to them are explained in detail in [7] . Each of the four nodes corresponding to these case studies is itself an individual BN with decision nodes that represent safety enhancement products. Furthermore, each of the four nodes is modeled as a class and is comprised of different hierarchical layers that represent various entities. *********************** Insert Fig. 15 . here ***********************
The directed edges between the decision variables represent the temporal aspect associated with each product implementation decision. Each chance node in the HBN has two states: "Occur" and "Not Occur", whereas each decision node has states "Implemented" and "Not Implemented". Qualitative and quantitative modeling of any BN, that is, constructing the BN with nodes and their interactions, and quantifying the CPTs, is performed with the assistance of aviation experts' judgments. Expert opinions play a crucial role in modeling with BNs, which are therefore also named Belief Networks [4] . The reasoning behind any node and directed edge in the HBN of this paper can be found in [7] . Following the class/object representation approach and input/output specifications for each class, the generic maintenance-related aircraft accident case is modeled by a top-down process for each of the four case studies shown in Fig. 13 . Table 1 depicts the classes used in each representative case study.
********************** Insert Table 1 here **********************
The hierarchical model includes a total of 185 nodes with 111 chance and 74 decision nodes. The total number of internal and output chance nodes is 60, and total number of input chance nodes is 44. 52 of the decision nodes in the model are internal or output decision nodes and 16 decision nodes are input nodes.
Results

Safety Product Implementations in Objects
An important question concerns results when the safety enhancement products are implemented by certain end users. The end users differ from one product suite to another and can be classified as the FAA regulatory agency, manufacturers, operators, all personnel in the aviation industry including the flight crew, maintenance crew, etc. [14] . The hierarchical layers in the four case studies are in accordance with the classification of the end users. Hence, analyses are performed as to implementations of which end users contribute to the safety enhancement the most. In other words, it is crucial to assess the percentage decrease of the probability of the Generic Structural Failure (GSF) node being in its "Occur" state when products are implemented only in a certain class in the hierarchical model. This assessment yields the safety enhancement value for the GSF node. Table 2 depicts in Column 1 the probability that Part 121, Part 135 and the GSF nodes are in their respective "Occur" states when all the products in the model are in their respective "Not Implemented" states. Hence, column 1 represents the baseline probability values. Table 2 also depicts the probability that Part 121, Part 135 and the GSF nodes are in their respective "Occur" states when products only in Organizational Classes, Task and Environmental Classes, or Individual Classes are in their respective "Implemented" states. The "Decrease" columns in Table 2 show the percentage probability decrease values relative to the values in Column 1 when products are only implemented in a given class. For example, a relative probability reduction of 8.41% on the GSF node's "Occur" state is obtained when decision nodes are fixed to their "Implemented" states only in Organizational Classes.
************************ Insert Table 2 here ************************ Similarly, a safety enhancement value of 13.86% on the GSF is obtained when decision nodes are fixed to their "Implemented" states only in Individual Classes. Fig. 16 depicts the relative probability reduction values associated with implementation only in a given class, where Org, T/E, and Ind stand for
Organizational Classes, Task and Environmental Classes, and Individual Classes, respectively. *********************** Insert Fig. 16 . here *********************** Fig. 16 indicates that safety products have the highest impact when implemented in Individual Classes. In particular, their implementation has the highest impact on Part 135 carriers. The conclusion that implementation in Individual Classes has a relatively higher impact is substantiated with the fact that Individual Classes accommodate the most crucial error types, i.e. decision errors, which is mostly performed by the maintenance crew. Note that although the Organizational Classes are more distant from the GSF node than the Task and Environmental Classes, their impact is even slightly greater than the impact of Task and Environmental factors. The reason for this is that the Organizational Classes include many chance and decision nodes pertaining to various organizational entities such as the Regulatory Agency, Manufacturer, and especially Operator Classes. Despite the latent character of the causal and decision nodes in the Organizational Classes, they have significant impact on the GSF.
Cross-Case Analysis
Elements of the following product suites are encountered frequently in the Organizational Classes: SWAP, SAAP, AM, and ASMM. Hence, it is worth to analyze the models as to which product suite alone in the Organizational Classes contributes most to the relative probability reduction in Part 121, Part 135 and GSF nodes. Table 3 depicts this information. ************************ Insert Table 3 here ************************
The product suite that yields the highest safety enhancement when only implemented in Organizational Classes is SWAP, followed by ASMM, SAAP, AM suites.
Elements of SWAP, SAAP and ASMM suites are inserted frequently into the Task and Environmental
Classes of the hierarchical model. Table 4 depicts the projected effect of suites in the Task and Environmental Classes alone on the Part 121, Part 135, and Generic Structural Failure (GSF) nodes.
********************* Insert Table 4 here ********************* As Table 4 indicates, the effect of the SWAP suite in the Task and Environmental Classes alone has the highest effect on the generic node. The contributions of the ASMM and SAAP suites when implemented in the Task and Environmental Classes alone are equal to each other. Hence, it can be concluded that full implementation of the ASMM suite alone or the SAAP suite alone by the end users that appear in Task and Environmental Classes has the same significance in terms of reduction of the probability of a potential generic structure failure. Consequently, provided that costs of full implementations of each suite are given, a preference can be made by choosing to implement the suite with less cost. This is so since the probability reduction by the two suites are equivalent. Similar analysis can be carried out with regard to the Part 121
and Part 135 nodes.
The SWAP suite is the most frequently encountered suite among the Individual Classes as well. **************************** Insert Table 5 here **************************** Fig. 17 summarizes the information presented in Tables 3-5. **************************** Insert Fig. 17 . here **************************** As Fig. 17 indicates, SWAP products are prevalent across the maintenance-related case studies. This is coherent since SWAP products focus on predicting the human error link in the causal chain of events, and on mitigating risk generated by aircraft maintenance and inspection operations. Other products frequently encountered in the case studies are ASMM, SAAP, and finally the AM products. The ASMM, SAAP, and AM products occur less than the SWAP products in terms of quantities in the classes. Hence, it is prudent to perform analysis on these suites within their associated classes, as shown in Tables 3 and 4 . For instance, the AM products, when implemented only in Individual Classes, have very little significance in terms of probability reduction on the GSF node. However, the AM products play an important role within the Organizational Classes and specifically in the Manufacturer Classes. Note that, approximately, a relative probability reduction of 15% is obtained when all products in the model are in their respective "Implemented" states.
************************ Insert Fig. 18 . here ************************
Conclusions and Future Research
The current ASRM research is based on multiple case designs, where an accident category is represented by multiple case studies. Hence, more than one probability value is obtained that pertains to an accident category. HBNs provide the modeling flexibility of combining multiple cases into one generic case using representative indices for each case. Consequently, a single probability value can be obtained. The safety enhancement values associated with an accident category can be obtained by running scenario analyses in different sub-cases. Hence, this paper attempts to evaluate the impact of different combinations of safety products using a holistic and therefore a more realistic model.
The aviation system is a complex problem domain that is characterized by the uncertainty associated with its attributes. This structured domain calls for a structured approach, where interactions among the attributes can be captured in a probabilistic manner. HBNs provide the flexibility of representing a node as a collection of random variables and causal dependencies among them. This provides a structured representation of the complex problem leading to more compact models. Consequently, cross-case analyses are performed in compact and structured representations.
Aviation accidents are generally attributed to causal factors, which directly lead to consequences. A good example for such a causal factor is the decision errors performed at individual levels. However, accidents can further be traced to latent failures such as task and environmental, and organizational factors [20] . Fig. 18 . Column I. Baseline probabilities when none of the products is implemented Column II. Probabilities when all the products are implemented Column III. Relative probability decreases with respect to columns I when all products are implemented List of Tables   Table 1 Classes in each representative case study Table 2 Absolute and relative probability values Table 3 Comparison of projected effects of suites in Organizational Classes alone on the Part 121, Part 135, and Generic Structural Failure (GSF) nodes Table 4 Comparison of projected effects of suites in the Task and Environmental Classes alone on the Part 121, Part 135, and Generic Structural Failure (GSF) nodes Table 5 Comparison of projected effects of suites in Individual Classes on the Part 121, Part 135, and Generic Structural Failure (GSF) nodes 
